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Abstract
Experiments often include multiple treatments, with the primary goal to compare
the causal effects of multiple treatments. While comparing the magnitudes of the
average treatment effects (ATEs) is straightforward, there exist few methods to
systematically compare the causal anatomies of each treatment—that is, the col-
lection of causal mechanisms underlying each treatment’s total effect—in order
to understand the sources of their relative magnitudes. This study introduces a
framework for comparing the causal anatomies of multiple treatments through the
use of causal mediation analysis. The study proposes a set of comparative causal
mediation estimands that compare the mediation effects of different treatments via
a common mediator. It derives the properties of a set of estimators, which are
shown to be consistent (or conservative) under a set of assumptions that do not re-
quire the absence of unobserved confounding of the mediator-outcome relationship,
which is a strong and nonrefutable assumption that must be made for consistent
estimation of individual causal mediation effects. To illustrate the method, this
study presents an original application investigating the effect of international legal-
ity on the domestic political costs that democratic governments suffer for violating
foreign policy commitments.
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I. Introduction
Causal mediation analysis aims to open the “black box of causality,” offering the opportunity
to explore how and why certain treatment effects occur in addition to simply detecting the
existence of those effects. Estimation of causal mediation effects, which are effects transmitted
via intermediary variables called mediators, has traditionally been implemented using the
parametric structural equations model (SEM) framework (Baron and Kenny, 1986). More
recent years have seen important advances in the formalization, generalization, and estimation
of causal mediation effects within the potential outcomes framework (Robins and Greenland,
1992; Albert, 2008; Imai et al., 2010a, 2011a,b) and both parametric and nonparametric SEM
frameworks (Pearl, 2001; VanderWeele, 2009). Causal mediation analysis is often used in
experimental research. In the most commonly used “single-experiment design,” the treatment
variable is randomized and the mediator(s) observed.
Another trend in experimental research is the design of more complex experiments featur-
ing multiple treatment arms. As knowledge and empirical results have accumulated in various
academic sub-fields and in specific program evaluation contexts, experimental research ques-
tions have evolved in ways that require evaluating multiple related treatments. Instead of
simply testing the effects of single treatments, often of primary interest are the empirical and
theoretical differences between the effects of multiple treatments. Indeed, scientific and social
scientific theories usually entail causal mechanisms, and hypotheses on why one treatment
should have a larger effect than another tend to be based on presumed mechanism(s) through
which each treatment propagates its effect. In addition, program and policy evaluation often
involves comparing the efficacy of multiple possible interventions and determining how to most
efficiently target different interventions to different contexts. In both research settings, richer
insights can be gained from comparing different treatments’ causal anatomies—that is, the
ensemble of causal mechanisms that endow each treatment with its effect.
This study presents a new framework for comparing the causal anatomies of multiple treat-
ments through the use of causal mediation analysis. It proposes a novel set of comparative
causal mediation (CCM) estimands that compare the mediation effects of different treatments
via a common mediator. In addition, the value of the method is enhanced by the fact that, as
this study shows, these CCM estimands can be estimated under fewer threats to internal valid-
ity than individual causal mediation effects. Specifically, consistent estimation of individual
causal mediation effects requires the strong and nonrefutable assumption of no unobserved con-
founding of the mediator-outcome relationship. In contrast, this study derives the properties
of a set of estimators for the CCM estimands and shows these estimators to be consistent (or
conservative) under assumptions that do not require the absence of unobserved confounding
of the mediator-outcome relationship. The study also derives the finite-sample properties of
these estimators, showing how adjustments can be made to improve their central tendencies
in small samples.
The estimators are easy to understand and implement, thereby providing researchers with
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a simple, reliable, and systematic method of comparing, discovering, and testing the causal
mechanism differences between multiple treatments. An original application, investigating
the effect of international legality on the domestic political costs that democratic governments
suffer for violating foreign policy commitments, is presented to illustrate the method. Software
is also offered to implement the method.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides motivation and
explains the value, in both theoretical and policy contexts, for comparing the causal mediation
effects of multiple treatments. Section III formally introduces the new CCM estimands. Section
IV then presents an estimation framework, describing the assumptions and methods under
which the CCM estimands can be estimated consistently. Section V presents simulations to
illustrate these properties of the estimation framework. Section VI then describes how these
properties change—namely, how the CCM estimands can be estimated conservatively but no
longer consistently—under a relaxation of the assumptions. Section VII presents the original
application illustrating the CCM method. Section VIII concludes.
II. Motivation for Comparing Causal Mediation Effects
As research agendas in both academic and policy contexts advance, experimental research often
involves evaluating distinct but conceptually or administratively related treatments. Compar-
ing the magnitudes of the average treatment effects (ATEs) of multiple related treatments is
a valuable first step, but simple ATE comparisons provide little insight into the specific pro-
cesses by which one treatment achieves a larger effect over another—and, alternatively, whether
equally sized treatments are truly interchangeable or instead work via different channels. In
research contexts where multiple related treatments are under study, richer insights can be
gained from comparing the related treatments’ causal anatomies. Such investigations can be
useful for making theoretical discoveries, as well as program evaluation and policy targeting.
A. Testing Theories
While experimental tests of social scientific theories often begin and end with estimation of
ATEs, those theories almost always also involve causal mechanisms or channels that remain
untested. And in research contexts involving multiple related treatments, theories on why one
treatment should have a larger effect than another are based on the presumed mechanism(s)
through which each treatment propagates its effect.
As one example, consider the recent accumulation of experimental evidence in the political
science literature on “audience costs” (for a brief review, see Hyde, 2015). Audience costs refer
to the electoral costs to politicians (i.e. punishment by voters) for breaking policy commit-
ments, and the past ten years have seen a deluge of survey experiments providing evidence
that voters do, indeed, tend to punish policymakers for reneging on foreign policy commitments
(e.g. Tomz, 2007; McGillivray and Smith, 2000; Chaudoin, 2014; Chilton, 2015; Hyde, 2015).
These many studies have differed greatly, however, not only in terms of their foreign policy
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contexts (e.g. security scenarios, international economic scenarios, etc.) but also in terms of
the specific nature of the foreign policy commitment (e.g. informal, legal, etc.). One may
then wonder whether and why the nature of such a commitment might affect the strength of
the audience cost effect—for instance, through what mechanism may a legalized foreign policy
commitment gain audience cost strength over an informal commitment. This is a question that
can be answered by comparing the causal anatomies of different audience cost treatments, and
an original application is presented in detail later in section VII to explore this issue.
Another example exists in the well-developed literature on party cues in American politics,
which includes a wealth of experimental studies that investigate party cue effects on voter
attitudes and behavior.1 As this literature has highlighted, not all party cues are made equal;
instead, there are various types of party cues, with empirical evidence suggesting that some
work more forcefully than others. For instance, there is some experimental evidence that
out-party cues may, in fact, be more influential than in-party cues (Aaroe, 2012; Arceneaux
and Kolodny, 2009; Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010; Goren et al., 2009; Nicholson, 2012). Yet
while there is evidence on the relative magnitudes of these two types of cues, the reasons or
precise mechanisms by which out-party cue effects exceed those of in-party cues have been
theorized but not tested in a disciplined manner. Doing so would involve a rigorous method
for comparing the mechanisms underlying each set of party cues.
B. Program Evaluation and Policy Targeting
Comparing the causal anatomies of related treatments also offers great value in the policy
and program evaluation context, where multiple related treatments are often investigated in
individual studies. The basic goal in this context is to identify, often through experimental
studies, which policy interventions are effective in achieving certain economic, social, political,
or other outcomes. Ideally, the effectiveness of any preferred policy intervention should be
generalizable across time and different localities. However, because of constraints on resources,
as well as logistical and administrative realities, the execution of experimental studies is often
restricted to short periods of time and small subsets of locations. This results in empirical
findings with great internal validity in their localized context but potentially questionable
external validity, limiting the researcher’s confidence on whether the treatment found to be
most effective in the study would actually be the most effective one more widely or in a full-scale
deployment.
Ultimately, the goal of such studies is to enable policymakers (or other actors) to select
treatments that will be effective beyond the initial study locality—that is, to help policy-
makers efficiently target their policy interventions. This requires evaluating how different
treatments are likely to perform in different contexts. One important means of doing so is
developing a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms underlying different treatments,
1Party cues are public signals from political parties that associate a party with particular candidates or policy
positions, thereby affecting the attractiveness of those candidates or positions for voters who have partisan
orientations.
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as a treatment’s performance in a particular context depends upon whether or not its primary
mechanism(s) can properly operate in that context.
For instance, consider an experimental study on job training programs, aimed at finding em-
ployment for lower-income adults. Imagine the study is implemented in a handful of towns and
involves multiple training programs under consideration; for simplicity, assume two training
programs (i.e. two treatments and a control condition of no training). A preliminary analysis
of the results may reveal that both programs have roughly equal-sized effects on employment.
A superficial interpretation of these results would then be that the two programs are inter-
changeable and hence, upon launch of a follow-up large-scale policy intervention, the choice of
which specific training program to roll out could be made arbitrarily or based on other criteria.
However, given that the experimental results of the study were based on a single sample in a
single snapshot in time, such a decision-making rule could be severely sub-optimal.
Instead, to enable efficient policy targeting, it would be useful to investigate the causal
mechanism differences between the two job training programs. While their ATEs may have
been roughly equal, it is possible they achieved their positive effects on employment via different
channels. One program may have achieved its primary effect by increasing the job search
motivation of its participants, while the other may have achieved its primary effect by helping
its participants to develop specific skills. If equipped with such knowledge, policymakers
would be in a much better position to make optimal decisions on which job training program
to introduce in different localities. For instance, certain local economies may have a low supply
of low-skill jobs and a relatively higher supply of skilled jobs, and thus the training program
working primarily through the skill-development channel would be preferred in this locality.
In other words, knowledge of the relative causal anatomies of the two training programs would
enable more insightful comparative evaluation and ultimately more optimal policy targeting.
III. Comparative Causal Mediation (CCM) Estimands
As described above, much is to be gained from both a theoretical and practical policy stand-
point from evaluating the differences in causal anatomy between treatments. This section
introduces a set of comparative causal mediation estimands that allow for such an evaluation.
Let T denote a binary treatment variable, Y an outcome variable, and M an intermediary
variable that is affected by T and that affects Y . Causal mediation effects refer to the average
effect of T on Y transmitted via the mediator M . This is often termed the natural indirect
effect or, in the potential outcomes approach, the average causal mediation effect (ACME).
To provide a more formal definition, let Y (t,m) denote the potential outcome for Y given
that the treatment T and the mediator M equal t and m respectively, and let M(t) denote
the potential value for M given that T equals t. Following the potential outcomes approach
to causal mediation analysis presented by Imai et al. (2010b), the ACME for a single binary
treatment is defined formally as κ(t) = E[Y (t,M(1)) − Y (t,M(0))]. Note that the ACME is
a function of t, though in the case of no interaction between the treatment and mediator, the
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value of the ACME is the same for t = 0, 1.
This study deals with a context in which there are multiple treatments and the researcher is
interested in comparing the extent to which those different treatments transmit their effects via
a common mediator. For simplicity and conceptual clarity, consider a three-level experimental
design that involves a true control condition and two different mutually exclusive treatments.
The two treatments may be qualitatively different or one may be a scaled up version of the
other. Furthermore, there is a single mediator of interest. It may be the case that multiple
mediators have been measured in the experiment, but the estimands of interest will be applied
within the context of a single mediator at a time.2
Let T1 and T2 denote two mutually exclusive binary treatments and M denote a common
mediator. Now define the potential outcomes Y (t1, t2,m) and M(t1, t2), which allows for
defining a separate ACMEj and ATEj for each treatment Tj as follows:
ACME1 = κ1(t1) = E[Y (t1, 0,M(1, 0))− Y (t1, 0,M(0, 0))] (1)
ATE1 = τ1 = E[Y (1, 0,M(1, 0))− Y (0, 0,M(0, 0))] (2)
ACME2 = κ2(t2) = E[Y (0, t2,M(0, 1))− Y (0, t2,M(0, 0))] (3)
ATE2 = τ2 = E[Y (0, 1,M(0, 1))− Y (0, 0,M(0, 0))] (4)
Note that all effects (ACMEs and ATEs) are referenced against a control condition. In the
control condition T1 = T2 = 0, in the first treatment condition T1 = 1 and T2 = 0, and in the
second treatment condition T1 = 0 and T2 = 1.
As will be shown, in spite of the strong assumptions required for the identification of
any single ACME, a weaker set of assumptions—which, notably, does not contain the usual
assumption of no unobserved confounding of the mediator-outcome relationship—will allow
for consistent or conservative estimation of the following two comparative causal mediation
(CCM) estimands of interest.
Definition 1: Define the estimands of interest as follows:
Estimand 1 :
ACME2
ACME1
=
κ2(t2)
κ1(t1)
Estimand 2 :
(
ACME2
ATE2
)
(
ACME1
ATE1
) =
(
κ2(t2)
τ2
)
(
κ1(t1)
τ1
)
The first estimand measures the extent to which treatment 2 has a greater causal mediation
effect than treatment 1 in terms of the mediator of interest. This allows for testing whether
2It is worth explicitly noting that the method presented in this study does not apply to comparing the effects
of a single treatment transmitted via different mediators. In contrast to the method presented in this study,
trying to compare the effects transmitted via multiple mediators would compound the threat to internal
validity, as the problem of confounding is likely to affect different mediators to different extents and in ways
that cannot be measured or tested. As a separate issue, there is also a possibility of causal connections
between the mediators, further threatening clean identification and obscuring what is even being measured or
estimated. Guidance on how to handle these issues, which are not covered in this study, can be found in Imai
and Yamamoto (2013) and Daniel et al. (2015).
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one treatment has a stronger absolute effect transmitted through the mediator of interest,
relative to another treatment. For instance, in the job training policy evaluation described
earlier, it could measure whether one program had a stronger effect transmitted via job search
motivation than the other program. In contrast, the second estimand measures the extent to
which treatment 2 has a greater proportion of its total effect transmitted through the mediator
of interest, relative to treatment 1. This allows for testing the extent to which the mediator is
more important to the overall causal anatomy of one treatment versus another. For instance,
this could measure whether effect transmission via job search motivation comprised a larger
proportion of the overall effect of one job training program versus the other in the example
above. Table 1 summarizes the general research questions related to each CCM estimand.
Table 1: General Research Questions Related to Each CCM Estimand
Estimand 1 Does T2 exhibit stronger effect transmission
via mediator M than T1 does?
Does the second treatment have a larger mediated effect in absolute terms?
H0 :
ACME2
ACME1
= 1 Ha :
ACME2
ACME1
> 1
Estimand 2 Does effect transmission via mediator M make up a
larger proportion of ATE2 relative to ATE1?
Is M more important for ATE2 than ATE1?
H0 :
(
ACME2
ATE2
)
(
ACME1
ATE1
) = 1 Ha :
(
ACME2
ATE2
)
(
ACME1
ATE1
) > 1
Which of the two estimands is of interest will depend upon the empirical and theoret-
ical goals of a particular research project. When the researcher’s main goal is to identify
which treatment has the strongest absolute effect transmitted via a specific causal channel,
the first estimand is likely to be of primary interest. The case of evaluating different job
training programs, as presented earlier, provides an example. From the standpoint of optimal
policy implementation, the researcher may choose to focus on one specific causal channel, pri-
oritizing transmission of the causal effect via that channel and discounting transmission via
other channels. For instance, if the researcher knows that the training programs under con-
sideration will, in the post-evaluation period, be rolled out in target areas where increasing
job-search motivation is unlikely to be an effective method of increasing employment (e.g. in
local economies with a low supply of low-skill jobs), then it makes sense for the researcher to
prioritize the skill-development causal channel. In other words, the researcher’s goal should be
to identify which job training program leads to the largest increase in employment specifically
via the skill-development channel, regardless of the magnitude of the effect transmitted via the
channel of job-search motivation and perhaps even regardless of the relative magnitudes of pro-
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grams’ overall ATEs. In that case, the researcher’s goal would be achieved by investigating the
first CCM estimand, which would measure how much larger one treatment’s skill-development
causal channel is than that of the alternative treatment(s).
If, instead, the researcher is interested in better understanding multiple treatments’ relative
causal anatomies more generally, then both the first and second CCM estimands should be of
interest. Considering both estimands could be useful in particular for theoretically motivated
researchers who are seeking to test theories involving multiple treatments. Such theories not
only predict whether one treatment should be more effective than another but also often
dictate (a) the specific causal mechanisms that should grow or shrink when switching from
one treatment to another and (b) the specific causal mechanisms that should contribute a
larger share of the overall ATE for one treatment versus another. Indeed, for the purposes of
theory testing and exploration, the two CCM estimands could be considered in conjunction
with the ATEs to form a full picture of the relative causal anatomies of different treatments.
To illustrate, Table 2 provides a set of some of the theoretical implications that would follow
from testing hypotheses about the CCM estimands in combination with the ATEs.
Table 2: Theoretical Implications of Combined Hypotheses
ACME2
ACME1
> 1
(
ACME2
ATE2
)
(
ACME1
ATE1
) > 1
ATE2 > ATE1 yes yes Disproportionate scaling up: Causal channel via M is larger
in both absolute and proportional terms for second treatment.
M is disproportionately responsible for enhancement of the effect
when switching from first to second treatment.
no no Unrelatedness of mediator: The larger effect of the
second treatment is not due to M.
yes no Proportionate scaling up: Causal channel via M is larger
in absolute but not proportional terms for second treatment.
M shares responsibility with other causal channels for enhancement
of the effect when switching from first to second treatment.
ATE2 = ATE1 yes yes Distinct causal anatomies: Despite equivalent ATEs, the
treatments are comprised of differently sized causal channels,
with M constituting a larger channel for the second treatment.
no no Indistinguishable causal anatomies: Any differences in
the treatments’ causal anatomies are unrelated to M.
Note: Missing yes/no conditions are not applicable.
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IV. Comparative Causal Mediation Estimation Framework
Estimators of the CCM estimands, as presented in this study, will be formulated within a
semi-parametric structural equations model (SEM) framework. A number of researchers have
critiqued the parametric SEM framework for its inflexibility and reliance on functional form
assumptions, instead advocating for more generalized, nonparametric formulations of causal
mediation effects (Imai et al., 2010a, 2011b; Pearl, 2001, 2014).3 These are important and valid
criticisms that researchers should keep in mind when considering the causal effects they are
interested in exploring and estimating. However, the employment of a semi-parametric SEM
framework is not necessarily restrictive in the context introduced by this study and can nest
within the potential outcomes framework, as shown below.
A. Single Treatment Background
Before proceeding to the comparative causal mediation context, consider the single treatment
causal mediation context. For a simple random sample of N independent observations, let
Yi(t,m) and Mi(t) denote the potential outcomes for subject i = 1, 2, ..., N . Further, for any
given subject, let the potential outcomes be fixed and characterized by the following:
Mi(0) = pii
Mi(1) = pii + αi
Yi(0,m) = λi + βim
Yi(1,m) = (λi + δi) + (βi + γi)m
The relationships above implicitly assume that the potential outcomes are linear in m, but
provide for unit-specific parameters and hence are otherwise flexible given a binary treatment.
In the case of a binary mediator in addition to a binary treatment, the relations would become
fully flexible and non-parametric. The relations above can be equivalently expressed by the
following equations:
Mi = pii + αiTi
Yi = λi + δiTi + βiMi + γiTiMi
These equations are written to share some notational similarities with the parametric SEMs
often used to describe causal mediation, though a key difference is that the equations here
allow for unit-specific parameters. As already described above, the only parametric constraint
imposed given the binary treatment is that the outcome is linear with respect to the mediator,
though in the case of a binary mediator, this no longer represents a constraint.
Under this semi-parametric set-up, we can highlight the relationship between the ACME
as defined under the potential outcomes approach and the natural indirect effect as defined in
the standard SEM approach to causal mediation:
3See Shpitser and VanderWeele (2011) and VanderWeele (2015) for a discussion of the connection between the
nonparametric SEM and potential outcomes approaches to causal mediation analysis.
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AMCE = κ(t) = E[Yi(t,Mi(1))− Yi(t,Mi(0))]
= E[λi + δit+ βi(pii + αi) + γit(pii + αi)]− E[λi + δit+ βi(pii) + γit(pii)]
= E[αi(βi + γit)]
In the classic SEM framework (Baron and Kenny, 1986), constant effects and no interaction
between treatment and mediator are assumed under the structural equations Mi = pi+αTi+i
and Yi = λ+ δTi + βMi + i. Applying those assumptions here, E[αi(βi + γit)] = αβ, which is
indeed the classic product-of-coefficients result in the SEM framework.4 However, this study
will not assume constant effects, and the no-interaction assumption will be introduced but
then relaxed.
B. Two Treatment Set-Up
Given two mutually exclusive treatment conditions (in addition to a control condition), the
semi-parametric framework presented above can be easily extended. Now, for a simple random
sample of N independent observations, let Yi(t1, t2,m) and Mi(t1, t2) denote the potential
outcomes for subject i = 1, 2, ..., N . Given the mutual exclusivity of the two treatments, the
following potential outcomes are defined:
Mi(0, 0) = pii
Mi(1, 0) = pii + α1i
Mi(0, 1) = pii + α2i
Yi(0, 0,m) = λi + βim
Yi(1, 0,m) = (λi + δ1i) + (βi + γ1i)m
Yi(0, 1,m) = (λi + δ2i) + (βi + γ2i)m
As before, the relationships above assume that the potential outcomes are linear in m, but
are otherwise flexible given mutually exclusive, binary treatments. In the case of a binary
mediator, the relations again would become fully flexible and non-parametric. The relations
above yield:
Mi = pii + α1iT1i + α2iT2i
Yi = λi + δ1iT1i + δ2iT2i + βiMi + γ1iT1iMi + γ2iT2iMi
ACME1 = κ1(t1) = E[Yi(t1, 0,Mi(1, 0))− Yi(t1, 0,Mi(0, 0))] = E[α1i(βi + γ1it1)]
ACME2 = κ2(t2) = E[Yi(0, t2,Mi(0, 1))− Yi(0, t2,Mi(0, 0))] = E[α2i(βi + γ2it2)]
4The equivalency of the product of coefficients to the natural indirect effect is specific to the linear SEM
formulation, though it has also been shown elsewhere to be a special case that nests within more general
frameworks of causal mediation (Jo, 2008; Pearl, 2014). This includes the potential outcomes framework,
where it has been shown that the ACME is equivalent to αβ under certain conditions (Imai et al., 2010b).
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For each parameter θi, define θ = E[θi] and θ˜i = θi − θ. The equations above can thus be
rewritten as follows:
Mi = pi + α1T1i + α2T2i + ηi
Yi = λ+ δ1T1i + δ2T2i + βMi + γ1T1iMi + γ2T2iMi + ιi
where
ηi = p˜ii + α˜1iT1i + α˜2iT2i
ιi = λ˜i + δ˜1iT1i + δ˜2iT2i + β˜iMi + γ˜1iT1iMi + γ˜2iT2iMi
In addition, also define the following:
Yi = χ+ τ1T1i + τ2T2i + ρi
ρi = χ˜i + τ˜1iT1i + τ˜2iT2i
ATE1 = τ1 = E[Yi(1, 0,Mi(1, 0))− Yi(0, 0,Mi(0, 0))] = E[τ1i]
ATE2 = τ2 = E[Yi(0, 1,Mi(0, 1))− Yi(0, 0,Mi(0, 0))] = E[τ2i]
This yields the following set of semi-parametric equations where the individual-level het-
erogeneity is subsumed into the error terms:
Mi = pi + α1T1i + α2T2i + ηi (5)
Yi = λ+ δ1T1i + δ2T2i + βMi + γ1T1iMi + γ2T2iMi + ιi (6)
Yi = χ+ τ1T1i + τ2T2i + ρi (7)
C. Assumptions
Recall that the estimands of interest are κ2(t2)
κ1(t1)
and
(
κ2(t2)
τ2
)/(
κ1(t1)
τ1
)
. The necessary assump-
tions for their consistent estimation are as follows.
The first identification assumption, which has already been implicit in the potential out-
comes notation used up to this point, is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA).
Assumption 1: Stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)
If T1i = T
′
1i, T2i = T
′
2i and Mi = M
′
i , then Yi(T1,T2,M) = Yi(T
′
1,T
′
2,M
′) and Mi(T1,T2) =
Yi(T
′
1,T
′
2), where T1, T2, and M denote the full treatment and mediator vectors across subjects
i = 1, 2, ..., N .
To be explicit, the linearity assumption is also reiterated.
Assumption 2: Linear relationships between the potential outcomes and the mediator.
Yi(0, 0,m) = λi + βim
Yi(1, 0,m) = (λi + δ1i) + (βi + γ1i)m
Yi(0, 1,m) = (λi + δ2i) + (βi + γ2i)m
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As already described above, while the assumption of linearity may seem rigid and demand-
ing, this assumption is made trivial by the employment of a binary mediator. Given a binary
mediator and the two mutually exclusive binary treatments, the potential outcome models de-
scribed above are fully saturated and hence “inherently linear” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009a, p.
37). This is why it need not be stated nor assumed that the potential values of the mediator are
linear in the treatments. This also helps to justify the exclusion of covariates from the model.
In contrast to the case of estimating a single causal mediation effect, the CCM estimands can
be estimated consistently without covariate adjustment, as will be shown shortly; furthermore,
inclusion of covariates would invalidate the full saturation, and hence linearity, of the models.
The next assumption is that the two treatments, in addition to being mutually exclusive,
have been completely randomized:
Assumption 3: Complete randomization of mutually exclusive treatments.
P (T1 = a,T2 = b) = P (T1 = a
′,T2 = b′)
for all a, a′, b, and b′ such that aTb = a′Tb′ = 0, 1Ta = 1Ta′, and 1Tb = 1Tb′ where 1 is
the N-dimensional column vector with all elements equal to one.
The third assumption is that there is no interaction between the treatments and mediator
in expectation.
Assumption 4: No expected interaction between the treatments and mediator.
γ1 = γ2 = 0
In other words, this assumption means that equation (6) becomes Yi = λ+ δ1T1i + δ2T2i +
βMi + ιi. Compared to assumptions 2 and 3, which can be guaranteed by design, this as-
sumption is somewhat stringent. However, this assumption will be relaxed (γ1 and γ2 will be
allowed to be non-zero) later.
Finally, the last assumption pertains to the covariances between the individual-level para-
meters.
Assumption 5: No covariance between individual-level treatment and mediator parameters.
Cov(α1i, βi) = Cov(α1i, γ1i) = 0
Cov(α2i, βi) = Cov(α2i, γ2i) = 0
This type of no-covariance assumption is also implicitly made in other approaches to causal
mediation. In the classic SEM formulation, the parameters are assumed to be constant struc-
tural effects, thereby meaning they do not vary across units and guaranteeing zero covariance
across units. In addition, in the potential outcomes approach to causal mediation as applied
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to a linear structural form, a conditional version of this assumption is implied by sequential
ignorability.5 It is worth noting that a conditional version of this assumption is not necessarily
any weaker or more plausible than an unconditional version, as there is no empirical or theor-
etical basis for expecting that any existing covariance between αji and βi will be attenuated
within conditioning strata of the population. This is in contrast to omitted variable bias, which
should generally be expected to shrink with stratification.
D. Consistent Estimation
Notably, the method presented here dispenses with the assumption of no confounding of the
relationship between the mediator and outcome, which is a strong and nonrefutable assumption
that is the most often criticized component of causal mediation analysis (e.g. Gerber and Green,
2012; Bullock et al., 2010; Glynn, 2012; Bullock and Ha, 2011). This assumption is required
regardless of the statistical framework used for the identification and estimation of causal
mediation effects, though its formal basis takes different forms depending on the statistical
framework. In the SEM approach, this takes the form of recursivity or no correlation between
the errors of the different equations, while in the potential outcomes framework, the uncon-
foundedness of the mediator-outcome relationship is implied by the “sequential ignorability”
assumption. Notably, methods of sensitivity analysis have been developed to systematically
assess the impact of violations of this assumption (e.g. Imai et al., 2010b). However, while
such analyses allow for evaluation of the sensitivity of causal mediation estimates, they do not
enable the recovery of consistent or unbiased estimates.
In the formulation here, such an assumption would take the form of E[ιi|T1i, T2i,Mi] = 0.
Because the mediator has not been randomized, however, this assumption is difficult to justify
and impossible to test; hence, this assumption will not be made. With the assumptions that are
made, described above, it can be shown that estimation of β via linear least squares regression
results in the bias term E[βˆ − β] = cov(ηi,ιi)
var(ηi)
. In contrast, αj can be estimated consistently
and without bias for both j = 1, 2. The key implication of these results is that, if comparing
two treatments and their mediated effects via the same mediator, then a common bias afflicts
both estimated ACMEs. By corollary, this means that the unavoidable mediation bias does
not prevent us from comparing the causal mediation anatomies of two different treatments, as
long as we are doing so in terms of the same mediator, thereby enabling us to gain important
comparative insights on the mediation processes entailed by sets of treatments.
Proposition 1: Call τˆN2 , τˆ
N
1 , αˆ
N
2 , αˆ
N
1 , and βˆ
N the linear least squares regression estimators
of the parameters from equations (5), (6), and (7) given a simple random sample of size N
5As Imai et al. (2010b) note, the sequential ignorability assumption implies a set of assumptions developed by
Pearl (2001), which includes the independence between the potential values of the outcome and the potential
values of the mediator. In the linear structural form, αi is a function of the potential values of the mediator,
while βi is a function of the potential values of the outcome. The independence between the potential values
of the outcome and the potential values of the mediator implies the independence between these functions,
thus implying independence between αi and βi.
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from a larger population. Given assumptions 1-5, then the following estimators converge in
probability to the estimands of interest under the usual generalized linear regression regularity
conditions:6
plim
N→∞
(
αˆN2 βˆ
N
αˆN1 βˆ
N
)
=
κ2(t2)
κ1(t1)
and plim
N→∞
( αˆN2 βˆNτˆN2 )
(
αˆN1 βˆ
N
τˆN1
)
 =
(
κ2(t2)
τ2
)
(
κ1(t1)
τ1
)
In sum, the CCM estimands can be estimated consistently through the simple use of linear
least squares regression estimators.
E. Uncertainty Estimation
Because the estimands of interest are nonlinear functions of multiple quantities that must each
be estimated, the distributional behavior of the CCM estimators in finite samples is not imme-
diately obvious. Furthermore, because the estimators employ ratios in which the distribution
of the denominator may have positive probability density at zero, these estimators do not
necessarily have finite-sample moments. This pathological problem is characteristic of ratio
estimators in general, and it theoretically complicates the calculation of confidence intervals
for those estimators. The existence of probability density at the point where the denominator
equals zero creates a singularity in the distribution of a ratio estimator, which can result in
the mysterious unbounded confidence interval. Yet traditional methods for constructing con-
fidence sets do not necessarily take this property into account, and it has been shown that
“any method which cannot generate unbounded confidence limits for a ratio leads to arbitrary
large deviations from the intended confidence level” (von Luxburg and Franz, 2009; Gleser
and Hwang, 1987; Koschat, 1987; Hwang, 1995). This issue has been studied extensively, with
exact solutions having long ago been derived in special cases (e.g. Fieller, 1954) and approx-
imation techniques based on the bootstrap developed recently for more general cases (Hwang,
1995; von Luxburg and Franz, 2009).
However, it has also been shown that in spite of the mathematical problems with ratio es-
timators, the use of standard methods for the practical estimation of confidence intervals yields
approximately correct coverage under the reasonable condition that the confidence interval is
actually bounded at the desired α level, which is met when the 1−α confidence interval of the
denominator does not contain zero (Franz, 2007).7 These are also the conditions under which
the CCM estimators can provide meaningful insights from a conceptual perspective. In those
cases where the distribution of the estimated quantity in the denominator is not sufficiently
bounded away from zero (i.e. where one of the mediation effects or proportions mediated is
approximately zero), then it is not a conceptually meaningful quantity for use in these CCM
6Proofs of propositions can be found in Appendix A.
7And, as in any situation, a sufficiently large sample size is also necessary for analytic methods that rely
on the central limit theorem and for bootstrap methods, which rely on the sample distribution adequately
approximating the population distribution.
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estimators.8 In other words, it falls outside of the meaningful scope of comparative causal
mediation.
In sum, the potentially pathological nature of the CCM estimators is more of a mathem-
atical inconvenience than a practical problem, just as is the case with the ratio-based Wald
instrumental-variables estimator and just-identified 2SLS estimator more broadly. As long as
the denominator is sufficiently bounded away from zero—i.e. significantly different from zero
at the chosen α level—then standard methods of confidence interval construction, including
the Delta Method and standard bootstrap techniques, can be used as a practical matter. Fur-
thermore, if the denominator is not sufficiently bounded away from zero, the variance and con-
fidence intervals of the estimators would explode, similar to the behavior of the just-identified
2SLS estimator, protecting the researcher from drawing misguided conclusions.9
Because the CCM estimands are only meaningful in the case that the denominator (for
either estimand) is non-zero, it is recommended that a denominator that is statistically signi-
ficantly different from zero at the chosen α level be treated as a precondition for proceeding
with CCM estimation. Not only is this recommended as a conceptual matter, but it also allows
the researcher to avoid the problems of unbounded confidence intervals and to use the Delta
Method and/or standard bootstrap techniques to compute confidence intervals.
F. Finite-Sample Adjustments
Due to their ratio form, the CCM estimators are not exactly centered on the true estimand
in finite samples. As the sample size grows, this divergence becomes negligible. In smaller
samples, finite-sample adjustments can be derived using Taylor series expansion. Appendix B
presents the resulting adjusted estimators for both CCM estimands. Simulations, presented
below, illustrate the improvement of the adjusted estimators over the simple estimators in
small samples.
V. Simulations
To illustrate the properties of the CCM method, this section presents a simulation. Simulated
causal mediation data were generated according to the following model, with the output of the
first equation, M , feeding into the second equation:
Mi = pii + α1iT1i + α2iT2i + ψiXi
Yi = λi + δ1iT1i + δ2iT2i + βiMi + φiXi
T1 and T2 are indicator variable vectors and were generated such that an equal number of units
were randomly assigned to (a) neither treatment, (b) T1, and (c) T2, with no units assigned to
8The analog in the instrumental variables estimation is a weak first-stage effect.
9For discussion of the finite-sample properties of just-identified 2SLS, including its lack of finite-sample moments
and its unstable variance behavior given a weak first stage, see Angrist and Pischke (2009a, pp. 205-218),
Angrist and Pischke (2009b), and Nelson and Starz (1988).
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both T1 and T2. The rest of the variables and parameters were generated as follows:
X ∼ Unif(0, 5) α1 ∼ N(4, 2) α2 ∼ N(10, 2) β ∼ N(3, 2)
δ1 ∼ N(5, 2) δ2 ∼ N(5, 2) ψ ∼ N(4, 2) φ ∼ N(4, 2) pi ∼ N(0, 1) λ ∼ N(0, 1)
As indicated, the parameters were generated to vary independently across units, yielding het-
erogeneous effects with zero covariance between αj and β for j = 1, 2. Further, the data were
also generated with no interaction between Tj and M for j = 1, 2. Along with the linear
form and the exogeneity of Tj for j = 1, 2, all assumptions established above are met by the
data-generating process.
Once the data were generated, the mean values of the parameters α1, α2, and β—as well
as τ1 and τ2—were estimated by linear least squares regression according to equations (5)-(7).
Thus X was omitted from the estimation process, simulating unobserved confounders and
hence biasing the estimation of β and the ACMEs.
In the results presented in Figure 1, the model was simulated 100 times with a total of 300
units per simulation (100 assigned to each of the two treatments and 100 assigned to neither
treatment). Each panel in the plot displays the point estimates from each simulation for a
different estimand, along with 95% confidence intervals constructed via the nonparametric
percentile bootstrap. The panels in the top row correspond to the traditional causal mediation
estimands: ACME1 (E[α1iβi]), ACME2 (E[α2iβi]), proportion of ATE1 mediated (
E[α1iβi]
E[τ1i]
),
and proportion of ATE2 mediated (
E[α2iβi]
E[τ2i]
). The panels in the bottom row correspond to
the CCM estimands, with both simple and small-sample adjusted estimators presented. The
panels note the coverage of the confidence intervals, the true value of the estimand according
to the data-generating process, and the mean estimate over all 100 simulations.
As can be seen, Figure 1 clearly shows how the traditional ACME estimators (top row)
are biased and exhibit confidence-interval under-coverage given the presence of unmeasured
confounders (X). The top left two panels show that the estimators of ACME1 and ACME2
are biased upward by approximately 2.5 and 6, resulting in only 90% and 72% coverage of the
95% confidence intervals. The story is the same for the top right two panels, which show the
estimates of the proportions mediated for each treatment.
In contrast to the clear bias of the traditional causal mediation estimators, the bottom row
shows that the CCM estimators are properly centered and exhibit good coverage. The bottom
left two panels present the estimators of the ACME ratio, the first being the simple estimator
and the second being the small-sample adjusted estimator. As can be seen, both perform well
in recovering a mean estimate close to the true estimand value and proper confidence interval
coverage (subject to simulation error). In addition, the small-sample adjustment also appears
to yield a better mean estimate, demonstrating the gains from this adjustment. The results
are the same in the bottom right two panels, which show the simple and adjusted estimators
for the ratio of proportions mediated.
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Figure 1: Comparative Causal Mediation Simulation: Without Interactions
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VI. Relaxing the No-Interaction Assumption
A. Set-Up
As before, recall the semi-parametric model:
Mi = pi + α1T1i + α2T2i + ηi (5)
Yi = λ+ δ1T1i + δ2T2i + βMi + γ1T1iMi + γ2T2iMi + ιi (6)
Yi = χ+ τ1T1i + τ2T2i + ρi (7)
The following will proceed without assumption 4, thereby allowing for treatment-mediator
interactions, which has been referred to by some scholars as a version of moderated mediation
(James and Brett, 1984; Preacher, 2007). In this case, of interest are functions of the ACMEs
for subsamples, namely for the treated units, κj(1), and for the control units, κj(0):
κ1(1) = E[α1i(βi + γ1i)] = E[α1iω1i] and κ1(0) = E[α1iβi]
κ2(1) = E[α2i(βi + γ2i)] = E[α2iω2i] and κ2(0) = E[α2iβi]
The same results as presented above (assuming no interactions) continue to apply in this
case with regards to the ACMEs for the control units, κ1(0) and κ2(0). However, the CCM
estimands are likely to be of greater theoretical and practical interest in terms of the ACMEs
for the treated units. In this case, the estimands of interest are as follows:
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Estimand 1 :
κ2(1)
κ1(1)
=
E[α2iω2i]
E[α1iω1i]
Estimand 2 :
(
κ2(1)
τ2
)
(
κ1(1)
τ1
) =
(
E[α2iω2i]
E[τ2i]
)
(
E[α1iω1i]
E[τ1i]
)
B. Conservatism of Estimators
Call τˆ2, τˆ1, αˆ2, αˆ1, βˆ, γˆ2, and γˆ1 the linear least squares regression estimators of the parameters
from equations (5), (6), and (7). Once again, the randomization of the treatments guarantees
consistency for τˆ2, τˆ1, αˆ2, and αˆ1 under standard regularity conditions, but not for βˆ, γˆ2, and
γˆ1.
10 Under certain conditions, it can be shown that αˆ2(βˆ+γˆ2)
αˆ1(βˆ+γˆ1)
and
(
αˆ2(βˆ+γˆ2)
τˆ2
)/(
αˆ1(βˆ+γˆ1)
τˆ1
)
are
not consistent estimators of κ2(1)
κ1(1)
and
(
κ2(1)
τ2
)/(
κ1(1)
τ1
)
, respectively, but are asymptotically
conservative (attenuated toward unity). These simple estimators are conservative only in the
probability limit because, as before, there is a finite-sample divergence due to the ratio form
of the estimators. However, also as before, that finite-sample divergence can be approximated,
estimated, and used to construct adjusted estimators.
Proposition 2: Without loss of generality, assume that both the numerator and denominator of
the estimator are positive, and that the estimator is greater than 1 (i.e. the numerator is larger
than the denominator). Call τˆN2 , τˆ
N
1 , αˆ
N
2 , αˆ
N
1 , βˆ
N , γˆN2 , γˆ
N
1 the linear least squares regression
estimators of the parameters from equations (5), (6), and (7) given a simple random sample
of size N from a larger population. Let ωˆN1 = βˆ
N + γˆN1 and ωˆ
N
2 = βˆ
N + γˆN2 . Further call ξ1
and ξ2 the asymptotic bias components of ωˆ
N
1 and ωˆ
N
2 , respectively (i.e. plimN→∞ ωˆ
N
1 −ω1 = ξ1
and plimN→∞ ωˆ
N
2 − ω2 = ξ2). Make assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 5. Then, given ω2ξ1 > ω1ξ2, the
following holds:
plim
N→∞
αˆN2 ωˆ
N
2
αˆN1 ωˆ
N
1
<
κ2(1)
κ1(1)
plim
N→∞
(
αˆN2 ωˆ
N
2
τˆN2
)
(
αˆN1 ωˆ
N
1
τˆN1
) <
(
κ2(1)
τ2
)
(
κ1(1)
τ1
)
The result is that, given the conditions described in Proposition 2, the bias attenuates
the estimates of the two CCM estimands. Since these results were presented without loss of
generality in the context where the estimands are greater than 1, this means that the attenuated
estimates will be conservative. In other words, the estimates will be biased in favor of the null
hypothesis that the estimands equal 1.
While assumption 4 (no interaction between the treatments and mediator) was relaxed,
Proposition 2 introduces the following additional condition that was not present in Proposition
1: ω2ξ1 > ω1ξ2. As shown in Appendix C, this condition can be partially assessed empirically.
10Loeys et al. (2016) describe specific conditions under which γˆ2 and γˆ1 are unbiased estimators even when βˆ
is not.
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C. Additional Notes
Similar to the case in which the no-interaction assumption is maintained, finite-sample adjust-
ments can be derived for the CCM estimators when relaxing the no-interaction assumption.
Appendix B presents these finite-sample adjustments. In addition, Appendix D presents sim-
ulation results to illustrate the properties of the CCM estimators when the no-interaction
assumption has been relaxed.
VII. Application: International Law and Audience Costs
A. Background
Does international law affect state behavior? There is a longstanding scholarly debate on this
question, with some political scientists and legal scholars viewing international law as largely
epiphenomenal to state interests and power (e.g. Downs et al., 1996; Goldsmith and Posner,
2005), and others seeing international law as having a real impact on state decision-making (e.g.
Goldstein, 2001). Among the latter group, many scholars have identified domestic political
processes and institutions as an important conduit through which national governments can be
induced to honor their international legal obligations, even in cases where those governments
did not intend to comply in the first place (Simmons, 2009; Trachtman, 2010; Hathaway, 2002;
Moravcsik, 2013; Dai, 2005; Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999). The electoral
compliance mechanism, in which governments are incentivized to maintain compliance with
international legal agreements under the threat of electoral punishment for violations, is one
possible domestic source of compliance.
In a number of recent studies using survey experiments, political scientists have accumu-
lated evidence that voters in the United States and elsewhere are indeed inclined to punish
elected officials who renege on previous foreign policy commitments (Tomz, 2007; McGillivray
and Smith, 2000; Chaudoin, 2014; Chilton, 2015; Hyde, 2015). The political costs that a govern-
ment incurs as a result of constituents disapproving of violations of policy commitments—which
may manifest in the form of electoral power in democracies or via the threat of protest and
dissent in non-democracies—are generally referred to as domestic “audience costs” (Fearon,
1994; Morrow, 2000; Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008; Jensen, 2003).
However, an important gap remains in this scholarship: while studies have shown that
public disapproval of a foreign policy decision tends to increase when that policy decision
requires reneging on international legal commitments, these studies have not isolated the role
of legality per se in generating that disapproval. Instead, the design of these studies has
masked the extent to which such disapproval is attributable to the baseline breaking of the
commitment (i.e. the audience costs for not honoring a policy pledge in general) versus the
additional legal status of the commitment. In other words, we do not know whether the
dimension of international legality actually enhances audience costs, and if it does, to what
extent or why that is the case.
Indeed, in scholarship on public attitudes toward international commitments, much of the
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international relations literature tends to abstract away the distinctive nature of legality and
treat international legal commitments as generic international commitments. The implica-
tions of such a framing is that legality should not affect the prospect for audience costs. Yet
there are, of course, reasons to believe that voters will respond more negatively to home gov-
ernment violations of foreign policy commitments when those violations also entail breaking
international law. Voters may view legal commitments as uniquely serious and solemn forms
of commitment, the violation of which is considered particularly objectionable, in which case
legality should increase the prospect for audiences costs. While this has been suggested in the
literature (Lipson, 1991; Abbott and Snidal, 2000a; Simmons and Hopkins, 2005), it has not
been explicitly tested.
B. Study Design
In order to address this gap in the literature, the author designed and implemented a novel
survey experiment embedded in an online survey administered in August 2015, with 1602 U.S.-
based respondents recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The experiment revolved around
a security scenario in which the U.S. government decided to take military action against ISIS
forces in Iraq.11
The scenario involved a U.S. military operation in Iraq to capture ISIS militants who
were threatening rocket attacks on neighboring countries but were hiding in a civilian zone.
Respondents were told that in order to avoid collateral damage, the U.S. military deployed
commandos in a covert operation, in which the commandos used an ostensibly non-lethal inca-
pacitating chemical gas to neutralize the ISIS militants. The incapacitating gas was featured
in the scenario in order to exploit real-world ambiguity surrounding the international legality
of chemical incapacitants in unconventional operations, as well as ambiguity surrounding the
lethality of these chemical agents. Because of this ambiguity and the technical nature of the
legal categorization of chemical incapacitants, survey respondents should not be expected to
identify such agents as clearly illegal, in contrast to well-known chemical warfare agents. At
the same time, it is also plausible and hence reasonable to convince respondents that these
chemical incapacitants are illegal under the Chemical Weapons Convention.12 As a result, it
was possible to effectively intervene upon respondents’ knowledge of the legal status of these
chemical incapacitants. The survey instrument text and variable coding rules can be found in
Appendix E, and sample demographic distributions can be found in Appendix F.
There were two primary goals of the research. The first goal was to disentangle the dimen-
sion of (il)legality from the baseline violation of a foreign policy commitment more explicitly
than have previous studies, thereby creating a more valid design to answer the research ques-
tion: Does the international legal status of a foreign policy commitment increase the potential
11This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Stanford University (Protocol 31139).
12While the illegality of chemical incapacitants is probably the most widely accepted position among arms
control legal experts, some experts have argued otherwise in terms of the use of chemical incapacitants under
certain conditions. For an overview of the debate, see Ballard (2007).
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for domestic audience costs if that commitment is violated? To achieve this goal, the exper-
imental design featured two mutually exclusive treatment conditions in addition to a control
condition. In the control condition, respondents were simply told about the U.S. government’s
decision to use military force employing chemical incapacitants. In the first “informal” treat-
ment condition, respondents were additionally told that this decision constituted a violation
of the U.S. government’s previous foreign policy commitment, but they were not given any
information about international legality. In the second “legal” treatment condition, respond-
ents were told that this decision constituted a violation of the U.S. government’s international
legal commitment. There were two binary outcome variables of interest. The first measured
whether or not the respondent disapproved of the policy decision to use chemical incapacitants,
which will be called Disapproval. The second measured whether or not the respondent would
be less likely to vote for a U.S. Senator who supported the policy decision, which will be called
Punishment.
The second research goal was to identify and better understand the contours of public opin-
ion that determine the extent to which legalization does (or does not) amplify audience costs.
In addition to measuring Disapproval and Punishment, other attitudes were also measured.
The primary attitude of interest, under investigation as a mediator, was the respondents’
perception of the (im)morality of the decision to use chemical incapacitants. Perceptions
of immorality represent a key theoretical reason, long noted by scholars, that voters would
more strongly disapprove of violations of legalized foreign policy commitments than similar
non-legalized commitments (e.g. Abbott and Snidal, 2000b, pp. 428-429). Hence, a binary
mediator variable measured whether or not each respondent believed the policy decision to be
immoral, which will be called Perceived Immorality. This enables estimation of the portion of
each treatment effect, ATE1 (informal) and ATE2 (legal), that is transmitted via Perceived
Immorality—that is, estimation of ACME1 and ACME2.
As described above, the problem with traditional mediation analysis is that, even with
pre-treatment covariates included as controls, those mediated effects are likely to be biased
and inconsistent. However, under the assumptions stated earlier, the CCM estimands can be
estimated consistently (or conservatively). The first estimand ACME2
ACME1
measures the extent to
which the morality mediator transmits a stronger effect for the legal treatment than for the
informal treatment. The second estimand (ACME2
ATE2
)/(ACME1
ATE1
) measures the extent to which the
morality mediator comprises a larger proportion of the total effect of (i.e. is more important
for) the legal treatment, compared to the informal treatment.
C. Results
The results of the survey experiment provide statistically and substantively strong evidence
that the legal treatment does indeed cause a larger increase in the probability of Disapproval
and Punishment than the informal treatment, as shown by Table 3, providing support for
the theory that legalization enhances audience costs. Specifically, the legal treatment had
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an estimated 12.5 percentage-point larger effect on the probability of Disapproval and a 9.9
percentage-point larger effect on the probability of Punishment than the informal treatment.
Table 3: Sample Estimates of ATEs
DV: Disapproval
ÂTE1 ÂTE2 ÂTE2 − ÂTE1
(Informal treatment effect) (Legal treatment effect) (Difference in treatment effects)
Estimate 0.195 0.320 0.125
Bootstrap 95% CI [0.134, 0.249] [0.265, 0.372] [0.065, 0.181]
DV: Punishment
ÂTE1 ÂTE2 ÂTE2 − ÂTE1
(Informal treatment effect) (Legal treatment effect) (Difference in treatment effects)
Estimate 0.182 0.281 0.099
Bootstrap 95% CI [0.127, 0.234] [0.226, 0.333] [0.039, 0.156]
More importantly in the context of this study, however, the results of the CCM analysis
also provided support for the theory that this enhancement of audience costs by legalization
is, at least in part, due to an increase in Perceived Immorality. Table 4 shows the results of the
CCM analysis. The assumption of no interaction between the treatments and mediator was
tested in the case of both dependent variables. The test failed to reject the null hypothesis of
no interactions in the case of the Disapproval dependent variable, and hence the no-interaction
assumption was maintained in that case.
However, the test rejected the null hypothesis of no interactions in the case of the Pun-
ishment dependent variable, which is why the causal mediation estimates in the Punishment
case involve the ACMEs for the treated (ACMETs)—that is κ1(1) and κ2(1). Furthermore,
additional tests provide support for the conditions necessary for the CCM estimators to be
conservative given the interactions between the treatments and mediator. Specifically, the
tests provide evidence that ω2ξ1 > ω1ξ2.
13
The CCM estimates are presented in bold in Table 4. Given the large sample size, these
estimates were obtained using the simple estimators,14 and the 95% confidence intervals were
computed via the nonparametric percentile bootstrap. As can be seen, the ÂCME2
ÂCME1
estim-
13As explained in Appendix C, this is tested partially by verifying that ωˆ2V̂ ar(Mii|T1 = 0, T2 = 1) >
ωˆ1V̂ ar(Mi|T1 = 1, T2 = 0).
14The finite-sample adjusted estimates are virtually identical, as should be expected given the sample size. For
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ates are statistically (and substantively) distinguishable from 1 for both dependent variables.
These estimates can be interpreted as meaning that the effect on Disapproval (Punishment)
mediated via Perceived Immorality is about 56% (83%) larger for the legal treatment than for
the informal treatment. In contrast, the
(
ÂCME2
ÂTE2
)
/
(
ÂCME1
ÂTE1
)
estimates are not statistically
distinguishable from 1 for either dependent variable. This means that while Perceived Immor-
ality transmitted a larger effect for the legal treatment than the informal treatment, it did not
necessarily constitute a larger proportion of the overall ATE for the legal treatment compared
to the informal treatment.
Table 4: Comparative Causal Mediation Analysis
DV: Disapproval
ÂCME2
ÂCME1
(
ÂCME2
ÂTE2
)
(
ÂCME1
ÂTE1
) ÂCME1 ÂCME2
Estimate 1.563 0.952 0.113 0.177
Bootstrap 95% CI [1.189, 2.170] [0.752, 1.212] [0.078, 0.149] [0.140, 0.215]
DV: Punishment
̂ACMET 2
̂ACMET 1
(
̂ACMET2
ÂTE2
)
(
̂ACMET1
ÂTE1
) ̂ACMET 1 ̂ACMET 2
Estimate 1.829 1.184 0.096 0.176
Bootstrap 95% CI [1.321, 2.657] [0.886, 1.635] [0.064, 0.131] [0.137, 0.213]
In combination, the results correspond to the case of “proportionate scaling up” presented
in Table 2. Perceived Immorality is found to be an important factor that leads to a scaling up
of the audience costs effect given legalization. Yet it appears that other mediation channels
also help to scale up that effect such that while the mediation channel via Perceived Immorality
expands, it does not increase as a proportion of the total effect. Overall, the collective evid-
ence provides support in favor of the theory that international legalization enhances audience
costs (at least partially) by amplifying the perceived immorality of violating a foreign policy
commitment.
instance, the adjusted estimate of ÂCME2
ÂCME1
for the Disapproval dependent variable is 1.533, and the adjusted
estimate of
̂ACMET 2
̂ACMET 1
for the Punishment dependent variable is 1.796.
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As explained in this study, it is difficult to have confidence in the accuracy of the individual
ÂCME estimates, even if covariates were to be included as controls, because this would re-
quire a strong assumption of no unobserved confounding of the mediator-outcome relationship.
However, under a weaker set of assumptions, one can have greater confidence in the estimates
of the CCM estimands, which also happen to be the estimands of primary interest for the
particular theory and hypotheses at stake in this and many other applications.
VIII. Conclusions
This study has introduced a novel set of causal mediation estimands which compare the causal
mediation effects of multiple treatments. It has shown that these estimands can be estim-
ated consistently or conservatively under weaker assumptions than can any single average
causal mediation effect (ACME). In particular, the usual assumption of no confounding of the
mediator-outcome relationship, which is required for consistent estimation of a single ACME,
is not necessary in the comparative causal mediation context presented in this study.
With the gradual accumulation of knowledge and empirical results in various academic sub-
fields and program evaluation contexts, experimental research increasingly involves evaluating
multiple treatments—that is, investigating the relative strengths and comparing the causal
anatomies of distinct but conceptually or administratively related treatments—rather than
simply testing the effects of single treatments. The method of CCM analysis presented in this
study provides a new tool for researchers who are interested in comparing, discovering, and
testing the causal mechanism differences between multiple treatments, and would like to do so
under the weakest possible set of assumptions.
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Appendix A: Formal Results
Proof of Proposition 1.
Given assumptions 1 and 2,
κj(tj) = E[αji(βi + γjitj)] = E[αjiβi] + E[αjiγjitj]
for j = 1, 2.
Given assumption 5,
E[αjiβi] + E[αjiγjitj] = E[αji]E[βi] + E[αji]E[γji]tj = αj(β + γjtj)
for j = 1, 2.
Given assumption 4,
αj(β + γjtj) = αjβ
for j = 1, 2.
Thus,
κ2(t2)
κ1(t1)
=
α2β
α1β
and (
κ2(t2)
τ2
)
(
κ1(t1)
τ1
) = (α2βτ2 )
(α1β
τ1
)
Now, given assumption 3,
E[ηi|T1i, T2i] = E[p˜ii + α˜1iT1i + α˜2iT2i|T1i, T2i]
= E[p˜ii|T1i, T2i] + E[α˜1i|T1i, T2i]T1i + E[α˜2i|T1i, T2i]T2i
= E[p˜ii] + E[α˜1i]T1i + E[α˜2i]T2i
= E[pii − pi] + E[α1i − α1]T1i + E[α2i − α2]T2i
= 0
i
and
E[ρi|T1i, T2i] = E[χ˜i + τ˜1iT1i + τ˜2iT2i|T1i, T2i]
= E[χ˜i|T1i, T2i] + E[τ˜1i|T1i, T2i]T1i + E[τ˜2i|T1i, T2i]T2i
= E[χ˜i] + E[τ˜1i]T1i + E[τ˜2i]T2i
= E[χi − χ] + E[τ1i − τ1]T1i + E[τ2i − τ2]T2i
= 0
Therefore, under standard regularity conditions for generalized linear regression model,
plim
N→∞
αˆN1 = α1
plim
N→∞
αˆN2 = α2
plim
N→∞
τˆN1 = τ1
plim
N→∞
τˆN2 = τ2
Further, by Slutsky’s theorem, and given non-zero parameters,
plim
N→∞
(
αˆN2 βˆ
N
αˆN1 βˆ
N
)
= plim
N→∞
(
αˆN2
αˆN1
)
=
(
plim
N→∞
αˆN2
)/(
plim
N→∞
αˆN1
)
=
α2
α1
=
α2β
α1β
=
κ2(t2)
κ1(t1)
And by the same argument
plim
N→∞
( αˆN2 βˆNτˆN2 )
(
αˆN1 βˆ
N
τˆN1
)
 = (α2βτ2 )
(α1β
τ1
)
=
(
κ2(t2)
τ2
)
(
κ1(t1)
τ1
)
ii
Proof of Proposition 2.
Given assumptions 1 and 2,
κj(1) = E[αji(βi + γji)] = E[αjiωji]
for j = 1, 2.
Given assumption 5,
E[αjiωji] = E[αji]E[ωji] = αjωj
for j = 1, 2.
Thus,
κ2(1)
κ1(1)
=
α2ω2
α1ω1
and (
κ2(1)
τ2
)
(
κ1(1)
τ1
) = (α2ω2τ2 )
(α1ω1
τ1
)
Now, given assumption 3, as in the proof of Proposition 1, under standard regularity
conditions,
plim
N→∞
αˆN1 = α1
plim
N→∞
αˆN2 = α2
plim
N→∞
τˆN1 = τ1
plim
N→∞
τˆN2 = τ2
It will thus be the case that
plim
N→∞
αˆN2 ωˆ
N
2
αˆN1 ωˆ
N
1
<
α2ω2
α1ω1
and
plim
N→∞
(
αˆN2 ωˆ
N
2
τˆN2
)
(
αˆN1 ωˆ
N
1
τˆN1
) <
(
α2ω2
τ2
)
(
α1ω1
τ1
)
if
plim
N→∞
ωˆN2
ωˆN1
<
ω2
ω1
iii
which is met when:
ω2 + ξ2
ω1 + ξ1
<
ω2
ω1
and hence when:
ω1ξ2 < ω2ξ1

iv
Appendix B: Finite-Sample Adjustments
Finite-sample adjustments for the CCM estimators can be derived using Taylor series expan-
sion.
Consider the first estimator under the no-interaction assumption, αˆ2βˆ
αˆ1βˆ
, which can (quite
apparently) be simplified to αˆ2
αˆ1
. Similarly, the estimand of interest can be seen simply as:
ACME2
ACME1
=
α2β
α1β
=
α2
α1
=
E[αˆ2]
E[αˆ1]
However, a first problem is the following:
E
[
αˆ2
αˆ1
]
6= E[αˆ2]
E[αˆ1]
=
α2
α1
A second problem is that E
[
αˆ2
αˆ1
]
may not even exist. To address both of these problems,
the estimator αˆ2
αˆ1
, which will be denoted as f(Θˆ) can be approximated using a (second-order)
multivariate Taylor series expansion around the estimand f(Θ):
f(Θˆ) ≈ f(Θ) +
∑
θ∈Θ
(θˆ − θ)fθˆ(Θ) +
1
2
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
θ′∈Θ
(θˆ − θ)(θˆ′ − θ′)fθˆθˆ′(Θ)
where Θ contains the full set of parameters (denoted individually by θ), fθˆ refers to the first
derivative of f with respect to θˆ, and fθˆθˆ′ refers to the second derivative of f with respect to
θˆ and θˆ′.
If we treat the higher-order terms in the Taylor series expansion as negligible, as conven-
tionally done, then we can identify the approximate divergence between the estimator and the
estimand, which is a quantity for which we can characterize the moments:
E
[∑
θ∈Θ
(θˆ − θ)fθˆ(Θ) +
1
2
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
θ′∈Θ
(θˆ − θ)(θˆ′ − θ′)fθˆθˆ′(Θ)
]
The first-order terms in this expression are zero in expectation (i.e. E[θˆ − θ] = 0), while
the leading components of the second-order terms are covariances in expectation (i.e. E[(θˆ −
θ)(θˆ′ − θ′)] = Cov(θˆ, θˆ′)). Thus, the divergence is approximately:
1
2
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
θ′∈Θ
Cov(θˆ, θˆ′)fθˆθˆ′(Θ)
This divergence can thus be estimated—by plugging in Θˆ for Θ and estimating the covariances—
and then subtracted from the simple estimator f(Θˆ) of interest to yield an adjusted estimator
that is approximately centered on the estimand of interest. Also evident from the expression
v
is that this divergence term goes to zero as the sample size n grows to infinity. The following
applies this process to the actual estimators in question.
A. Adjusted Estimators under the No-Interaction Assumption
A.1. Adjusted Estimator 1
The estimator for the first estimand is αˆ2βˆ
αˆ1βˆ
= αˆ2
αˆ1
. In expectation, the second-order Taylor
Series expansion of the estimator, T ( αˆ2
αˆ1
), around the estimand is:
E
[
T
(
αˆ2
αˆ1
)]
≈ α2
α1
− Cov(αˆ1, αˆ2)
α21
+
V ar(αˆ1)α2
α31
Hence, we can identify the component of the approximation that diverges from the estimand.
Because of the exogeneity of T , α1 and α2 can both be estimated without bias, allowing for the
individual pieces of that component to be estimated by regression. This can then be subtracted
from the estimator αˆ2
αˆ1
to yield an adjusted estimator approximately centered on the estimand:
αˆ2
αˆ1
+
Ĉov(αˆ1, αˆ2)
αˆ21
− V̂ ar(αˆ1)αˆ2
αˆ31
In the special case of balanced control and treatment assignment (i.e. P (C) = P (T1) =
P (T2) =
1
3
), the adjusted estimator simplifies to:
αˆ2
αˆ1
+
3σˆ2η
αˆ21N
− 6σˆ
2
ηαˆ2
αˆ31N
where σˆ2η refers to the estimated error variance from equation (5). Clearly, as N grows to
infinity, this converges on the simple estimator αˆ2
αˆ1
.
A.2. Adjusted Estimator 2
The simple estimator for the second estimand is ( αˆ2βˆ
τˆ2
)/( αˆ1βˆ
τˆ1
) = ( αˆ2
τˆ2
)/( αˆ1
τˆ1
) = αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1τˆ2
. As above, a
second-order Taylor Series expansion can be used to formulate an adjusted estimator that is
approximately centered on the estimand in finite samples:
αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1τˆ2
− V̂ ar(αˆ1) αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ31τˆ2
− V̂ ar(τˆ2) αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1τˆ 32
+ Ĉov(αˆ2, αˆ1)
τˆ1
αˆ21τˆ2
+ Ĉov(αˆ2, τˆ2)
τˆ1
αˆ1τˆ 22
−Ĉov(αˆ2, τˆ1) 1
αˆ1τˆ2
− Ĉov(αˆ1, τˆ2) αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ21τˆ
2
2
+ Ĉov(αˆ1, τˆ1)
αˆ2
αˆ21τˆ2
+ Ĉov(τˆ2, τˆ1)
αˆ2
αˆ1τˆ 22
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B. Adjusted Estimators when Relaxing the No-Interaction Assumption
Having discarded the no-interaction assumption, the estimator of the first estimand of interest,
κ2(1)
κ1(1)
, is αˆ2(βˆ+γˆ2)
αˆ1(βˆ+γˆ1)
= αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ1
.
As shown, plimN→∞ ωˆj = ωj + ξj, because of a confounding bias that does not disappear
asymptotically. Let ω∗j denote the biased and inconsistent version of ωj (i.e. plimN→∞ ωˆj = ω
∗
j ).
As shown above, under certain reasonable and testable assumptions,
α2ω∗2
α1ω∗1
is conservative (i.e.
attenuated toward 1) for α2ω2
α1ω1
and hence the estimator of interest is asymptotically conservative
for the estimand of interest. Unfortunately, for two reasons, this does not mean that in small
samples the estimator of interest is in expectation also conservative. First, as before, the
expectation may not even actually exist. Second, also as before, the ratio form of the estimand
leads the estimator to be decentered from the point to which it converges. However, also as
in the case with the no-interaction assumption, a second-order Taylor Series expansion can be
used to construct an adjusted estimator that in finite samples is approximately centered upon
the conservative point for which the estimator is consistent.
Specifically, the adjusted estimator is:
αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ1
− V̂ ar(αˆ1) αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ31ωˆ1
− V̂ ar(ωˆ1) αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ31
+ Ĉov(αˆ2, αˆ1)
ωˆ2
αˆ21ωˆ1
+ Ĉov(αˆ2, ωˆ1)
ωˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ21
−Ĉov(αˆ2, ωˆ2) 1
αˆ1ωˆ1
− Ĉov(αˆ1, ωˆ1) αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ21ωˆ
2
1
+ Ĉov(αˆ1, ωˆ2)
αˆ2
αˆ21ωˆ1
+ Ĉov(ωˆ1, ωˆ2)
αˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ21
where ωˆj = βˆ + γˆj from Equation 6 and covariance terms can be estimated via the bootstrap.
Following the same approach for the second CCM estimand, the adjusted version of the
second estimator,
(
αˆ2ωˆ2
τˆ2
)
/
(
αˆ1ωˆ1
τˆ1
)
, is:
( αˆ2ωˆ2
τˆ2
)
( αˆ1ωˆ1
τˆ1
)
− V̂ ar(αˆ1) αˆ2ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ31ωˆ1τˆ2
− V̂ ar(ωˆ1) αˆ2ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ31 τˆ2
− V̂ ar(τˆ2) αˆ2ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ1τˆ 32
+Ĉov(αˆ2, αˆ1)
ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ21ωˆ1τˆ2
− Ĉov(αˆ2, ωˆ2) τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ1τˆ2
+ Ĉov(αˆ2, ωˆ1)
ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ21 τˆ2
+Ĉov(αˆ2, τˆ2)
ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ1τˆ 22
− Ĉov(αˆ2, τˆ1) ωˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ1τˆ2
+ Ĉov(αˆ1, ωˆ2)
αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ21ωˆ1τˆ2
−Ĉov(αˆ1, ωˆ1) αˆ2ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ21ωˆ
2
1 τˆ2
− Ĉov(αˆ1, τˆ2) αˆ2ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ21ωˆ1τˆ
2
2
+ Ĉov(αˆ1, τˆ1)
αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ21ωˆ1τˆ2
+Ĉov(ωˆ2, ωˆ1)
αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ21 τˆ2
+ Ĉov(ωˆ2, τˆ2)
αˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ1τˆ 22
− Ĉov(ωˆ2, τˆ1) αˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ1τˆ2
−Ĉov(ωˆ1, τˆ2) αˆ2ωˆ2τˆ1
αˆ1ωˆ21 τˆ
2
2
+ Ĉov(ωˆ1, τˆ1)
αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ21 τˆ2
+ Ĉov(τˆ2, τˆ1)
αˆ2ωˆ2
αˆ1ωˆ1τˆ 22
In sum, if the assumption of no interaction between the treatments and the mediator is
relaxed, the CCM estimators are no longer consistent, but they are asymptotically conservative
vii
provided additional conditions are met. Those additional conditions are both theoretically
reasonable and empirically testable. Furthermore, finite-sample adjustments can be added to
the estimators such that they are also conservative in smaller samples.
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Appendix C: Tests and Sensitivity Analysis for the Conservatism of
Estimators with Interactions
As explained in the main text, given the conditions described in Proposition 2, the bias in-
volved in estimating κ2(1)
κ1(1)
and
(
κ2(1)
τ2
)/(
κ1(1)
τ1
)
results in conservative (attenuated toward 1)
estimates of these estimands. While assumption 4 (no interaction between the treatments and
mediator) was relaxed, Proposition 2 introduces the following additional condition that was
not present in Proposition 1: ω2ξ1 > ω1ξ2. This appendix shows how this condition can be
partially assessed empirically.
Recall the semi-parametric model:
Mi = pi + α1T1i + α2T2i + ηi (5)
Yi = λ+ δ1T1i + δ2T2i + βMi + γ1T1iMi + γ2T2iMi + ιi (6)
Yi = χ+ τ1T1i + τ2T2i + ρi (7)
Now, consider equations 5 and 6 in the model by treatment subsets:
(Mi|T1i = 1, T2i = 0) = pi + α1 + ηi (8)
(Yi|T1i = 1, T2i = 0) = λ+ δ1 + ω1Mi + ιi (9)
(Mi|T1i = 0, T2i = 1) = pi + α2 + ηi (10)
(Yi|T1i = 0, T2i = 1) = λ+ δ2 + ω2Mi + ιi (11)
where ω1 = β + γ1 and ω2 = β + γ2. Given the saturation of the model presented in equations
5 and 6, estimation of the parameters via linear least squares regression would yield identical
results if applied to equations 5 and 6 or the subsetted equations.
Consider estimation of ω1 and ω2 via linear least squares regression as applied to subsetted
equations 9 and 11. For both cases, j = 1, 2, this is a bivariate regression, and thus:
plim
N→∞
ωˆj =
Cov(Yi,Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
V ar(Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0) =
Cov(λ+ δj + ωjMi + ιi,Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
V ar(Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
=
ωjCov(Mi,Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0) + Cov(ιi,Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
V ar(Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
= ωj +
Cov(ιi, ηi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
V ar(ηi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
That is,
plim
N→∞
ωˆ1 = ω1 + ξ1 = ω1 +
Cov(ιi, ηi|Ti1 = 1, Ti2 = 0)
V ar(ηi|Ti1 = 1, Ti2 = 0)
plim
N→∞
ωˆ2 = ω2 + ξ2 = ω2 +
Cov(ιi, ηi|Ti1 = 0, Ti2 = 1)
V ar(ηi|Ti1 = 0, Ti2 = 1)
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Now, consider that: ω2ξ1 > ω1ξ2 implies that(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ2 − ξ2
)
ξ1 >
(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ1 − ξ1
)
ξ2
(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ2
)
ξ1 >
(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ1
)
ξ2(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ2
)
Cov(ιi, ηi|Ti1 = 1, Ti2 = 0)
V ar(ηi|Ti1 = 1, Ti2 = 0) >
(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ1
)
Cov(ιi, ηi|Ti1 = 0, Ti2 = 1)
V ar(ηi|Ti1 = 0, Ti2 = 1)
Unfortunately, the possibility of unobserved confounding given non-randomization of the
mediator makes it impossible to reliably estimate or compare Cov(ιi, ηi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0)
for i = 1, 2 without additional assumptions. However, in large samples, plimN→∞ ωˆj can
be approximated by ωˆj and V ar(ηi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0) can be approximated by V̂ ar(ηi|Tij =
1, Tij′ = 0) = V̂ ar(Mi|Tij = 1, Tij′ = 0) = σˆ2ηj using the observed data.
Hence,(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ2
)
Cov(ιi, ηi|Ti1 = 1, Ti2 = 0)
V ar(ηi|Ti1 = 1, Ti2 = 0) >
(
plim
N→∞
ωˆ1
)
Cov(ιi, ηi|Ti1 = 0, Ti2 = 1)
V ar(ηi|Ti1 = 0, Ti2 = 1)
can be partially assessed via:
ωˆ2σˆ
2
η2
> ωˆ1σˆ
2
η1
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Appendix D: Simulations when Relaxing the No-Interaction Assumption
To illustrate the properties of the CCM estimators once the no-interaction assumption has
been relaxed, this section presents the results of a simulation. The data-generating process
was similar to that of the simulation presented earlier except, in this case, the effect of the
mediator on the outcome involves interactions with both treatments. In addition, the simulated
sample size has been increased to 1000 units per treatment condition in order to better illustrate
the asymptotic tendencies.15 As before, positive bias is introduced by construction through
the omission in the estimation of a confounder that affects both the outcome and mediator.
Also as before, the ACME for the treated for the second treatment is larger than that of the
first treatment; further, the interaction between the mediator and the second treatment is
also made larger than the interaction between the mediator and the first treatment. Thus,
the additional conditions required for conservative estimation of the CCM estimands are met.
Figure D1 shows the resulting estimates in the simulation.
Figure D1: Comparative Causal Mediation Simulation: With Interactions
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As can be seen in the top row of Figure D1, the estimators of the ACMEs for the treated
are again biased upward and, as a result, also have bad confidence-interval coverage. In
contrast, however, the estimator of the ratio of ACMEs for the treated is much more well-
behaved. While no longer consistent, and hence not properly centered in this medium-sized
sample, the estimator is conservative (attenuated toward unity), as indicated by the mean
15For this reason, the finite-sample adjustments make little difference, and hence the adjusted estimators are
not presented here.
xi
estimate being closer to one than the true value. As a result of this conservatism, there
is unfortunately confidence-interval under-coverage. However, what makes this problem less
concerning is that the under-coverage is the result of attenuated estimates, as shown by the
majority of bad confidence intervals being below the true value, rather than the result of
systematically undersized confidence intervals.
The results are similar for the bottom row of Figure D1, which presents the estimates
for the proportions mediated, as well as the ratio of the proportions mediated. Again, the
traditional estimators are biased upward, while the CCM estimator is conservative.
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Appendix E: Application Text
Prologue
Please consider the following hypothetical scenario:
ISIS militants in Iraq were threatening rocket attacks on neighboring countries in the region.
In response, the U.S. government considered taking military action. The U.S. ruled out drone
strikes and other options because the ISIS militants were hiding in a civilian zone, and the
U.S. government wanted to avoid harming civilians. Instead, U.S. commandos were deployed
in a covert operation. In order to avoid inflicting permanent harm on nearby civilians, the
commandos used a non-lethal “incapacitating” chemical gas to knock out and capture the ISIS
militants. However, critics of the operation have pointed out that people have varying levels
of sensitivity to the incapacitating gas, and exposure can be fatal for some people. Hence, the
operation may have put civilian lives in harm’s way.
Treatment
CONTROL (no additional information provided)
OR
INFORMAL TREATMENT: Furthermore, the U.S. government has pledged never to use inca-
pacitating chemical gas in previous public statements. Hence, the U.S. government has broken
its pledge.
OR
LEGAL TREATMENT: Furthermore, the U.S. government has pledged never to use incapa-
citating chemical gas under its membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention, the interna-
tional treaty banning chemical weapons. Hence, the U.S. government has broken international
law.
DV 1: Disapproval
In general, do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. government’s decision to use the incapa-
citating gas in the operation?
• Approve Strongly, Approve, Neither Approve nor Disapprove, Disapprove, Disapprove Strongly
• Variable is dichotomized for analysis, with 1 indicating “Disapprove” or “Disapprove Strongly,” and 0 otherwise.
DV 2: Punishment
Imagine that one of your U.S. Senators voted in favor of using the incapacitating gas. Would
this increase or decrease your willingness to vote for that Senator in the next election?
• Increase Greatly, Increase, Neither Increase nor Decrease, Decrease, Decrease Greatly
• Variable is dichotomized for analysis, with 1 indicating “Decrease” or “Decrease Greatly,” and 0 otherwise.
xiii
Mediator: Perceived Immorality
To what extent do you believe that the decision to use the incapacitating gas in the operation
was morally right or wrong?
• Definitely Right, Probably Right, Not Morally Right or Wrong, Probably Wrong, Definitely Wrong
• Variable is dichotomized for analysis, with 1 indicating “Probably Wrong” or “Definitely Wrong” and 0 otherwise.
xiv
Appendix F: Application Sample Demographics
Table F1: Sample Demographics
Gender
Female Male
46.3% 53.7%
Age
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
38.9% 41.1% 18.5% 1.6%
Education
No High School High School Some College College Graduate
0.8% 11.9% 34.1% 53.1%
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